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By Lillian M. Li
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

Silks by Sea: Trade, Technology, and
Enterprise in China and Japan*
,r Although East Asia's silk trade with the West stretched far back into
antiquity, the middle and later years of the nineteenth century witnessed
a remarkable growth in the European and American demand for silk. This
imparted a tremendous impetus to the Chinese and Japanese industries.
For some eighty years.from the 1850s through the 1930s, trade flourished
until the coming of synthetic fibers and world war curtailed its growth.
The rise of so large an international business obviously had a significant
impact on these countries, one that was particularly profound in the case
of Japan. When the upsurge in trade began, both China and Japan were
at roughly comparable stages in their economic development, but when
the trade ended with the onset of war, it was Japan, not China, which had
emerged as one of the leading industrial nations of the world. While few
would contend that silk alone, however important, accounted for this
differing course of national development, the dissimilar paths followed
by the Chinese and Japanese silk industries not only reflected many themes
characteristic of business enterprise in those countries but also typified
their divergent national experience during this dramatic era of economic
growth.

During the 1950s and 1960s, East Asian historiography in
the United States was largely organized around the notion of the
contrasting "responses" of China and Japan to the West and the
relatively greater success of the Japanese in achieving rapid
"modernization." Although these concepts have justifiably come
under attack for reflecting a Western standard of judgment, the
amazingly rapid transformation of Japan from an isolated, feudal,
agrarian society to an industrial superpower in little more than
Business History Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1982). Copyright© The President and Fellows of
Harvard College.
• The Chinese side of this essay is based on material from my book, China's Silk Trade: Traditional
Industry in the Modem World, 1842-1937 (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1981). This
essay was originally presented as a paper at the Conference on United States-East Asian Economic Relations,
held in June 1976 at Mt. Kisco, New York. I am grateful to Cheng-lung Ch'en for research assistance on the
Japanese side of this project during its initial stages, and to Kazuko Yoshida Furuta for assistance in the
final stages. Ms. Furuta, formerly a graduate student in the Department of International Relations at Tokyo
University, and now a graduate student at Princeton University, has published her undergraduate thesis
on the Japanese silk industry (see note 23 below). I am also grateful to Professor Richard J. Smethurst,
Department of History, University of Pittsburgh, for his comments on this paper. Swarthmore College and
the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University have given me generous institutional
support over the years.
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a century has maintained-indeed increased-its fascination for
Western scholars, particularly in view of the apparently declining
competitiveness of the American economy. While it is the Japanese case that seems extraordinary for its speed, and not the
Chinese for its slowness, the comparison between China and
Japan still seems uniquely appropriate because of the broad similarities in their cultural and economic backgrounds before the
nineteenth century, and the clear similarity of their relationship
to the West during the early nin.eteenth century. 1
Because the silk industry of China and Japan used the same
basic technology and sold its products in the same world market,
it serves as an excellent case study through which to compare
the process of economic change in these two countries. Although
interpretations of their different "responses" to the West have
tended to seek broad cultural and ideological explanations for
the strength of Japanese political leadership and the vitality of
Japanese entrepreneurship-the two critical instruments of Japanese economic development-this article will seek a middle
level of explanation to stress the methods by which government
leadership and entrepreneurship helped to develop the silk export trade. Among Japanese historians of the Meiji restoration
there has been considerable debate about the relative emphasis
that should be given the leadership from above and initiative
from below, but a comparison of the Japanese case with the
Chinese highlights the extent to which both types of enterprise
were essential. Government-sponsored model factories, enlightened regulations, schools, inspection stations, banks, and other
measures formed the principal institutions that facilitated change.
Government leadership, however, could not have succeeded
without a supporting social and economic infrastructure that included entrepreneurial talent, institutional flexibility, and plentiful capital as its major elements. 2
1 A critique of the Western stimulus, Chinese response approach may be found in Paul A. Cohen, "Ch'ing
China: Confrontation with the West, 1850-1900," in James B. Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays in
Interpretation (New York, 1970), 29-61. The modernization approach to modem Japanese history finds its
fullest expression in a series of conference volumes put out by Princeton University Press. The introductory
volume is Marius B. Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965).
A sharp attack on the modernization approach is made by John W. Dower in his introduction to the Origins
of the Modem Japanese State: Selected Works of E.H. Norman (New York, 1975), 8-102. Ezra F. Vogel's
Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, Mass., 1979) has attracted a great deal of attention
for emphasizing the superiority of Japanese management techniques over American techniques.
2 Perhaps the most notable of the "cultural" explanations is Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The
Values of Pre-industrial Japan (Glencoe, Ill., 1957), which in effect finds a counterpart to the Protestant
ethic in Japanese religion and thought. Economic historians have used the silk industry to ask theoretical
questions about the origins of capitalism in Japan. Some stress the leading role of the government and big
business in developing the silk trade, while others stress the importance of grass-roots initiatives. The
leading proponents of the former view are Ishii Kanji (see below, n. 8), and his professor, Yamaguchi Kazuo,
ed., Nlhon sangyo kinyushi kenkyii: seishl kinyuhen (Tokyo, 1966). The leading proponent of the latter view
is Yagi Haruo. See, for example, his Nihon kindai seishigyo no seiritsu-Nagano-ken Okaya seishigyoshi
(Tokyo, 1960).
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THE WESTERN MARKET

In ancient times, China conducted its silk trade with the West
along the famous Silk Road, which traversed central Asia, bringing precious Chinese silks to the Roman Empire. Mention of
Chinese silk usually evokes this memory. But from at least the
sixteenth century onward, China's silk exports to the West were
carried primarily along maritime routes in Portuguese, Spanish,
and other European vessels. From the 1850s until the 1930s, both
China and Japan exported silks to the West in quantities unknown
in ancient times. Silkworm disease, which struck French sericulture in the 1850s, initiated the modern European demand for
Chinese silk; but even when that disease was brought under
control, demand for Chinese and, later, Japanese raw silk expanded, since European sericulture simply could not match the
quality, quantity, or low cost of East Asian silk. The French silk
weaving industry was especially dependent on high-quality
white raw silk, known as Tsatlee, from central China.
In the twentieth century, however, it was the new American
market, American tastes, and ultimately American technology
that shaped the international demand for raw silk. With an increasingly prosperous population, the United States became the
most important customer for raw silk in the world, and New York
replaced Lyon in France as the leading center of the silk trade.
Silk stockings became the standard of dress for both men and
women, making a virtual necessity of what had once been a
luxury. The American silk weaving industry, moreover, was always alert to opportunities to parlay fads and fashions into profits.
The wedding gown of Alice Roosevelt or the inaugural dresses
of Mrs. Woodrow Wilson and her three daughters created fashion
news that made silk manufacturers ecstatic. The revival of dancing in the United States was hailed as a boon to the silk business.
Although rayon entered the American market after World War
I, silk remained competitive, particularly for stockings, and it was
not really until 1939 with the invention of nylon by Du Pont and
the onset of World War II that the silk market really collapsed. 3
Although limited in duration to about 80 years, this international boom shaped the foreign trade of both China and Japan
and played an important role in their domestic economies. During
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, silk became
3 Silk Association of America, Annual Report, 1919, p. 706; 1906, p. 69; 1913, p. 36; and 1914, p. 15.
Jesse W. Markham, Competition in the Rayon Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 33. In fact, during the
1920s and 1930s, the consumption of silk in the United States increased steadily, even as rayon gained great
popularity, See textile consumption figures in Sen'i kogyo (Choki keizai tokei, vol. 11), comp. Fujino
Shozaburo et al. (Tokyo, 1979), 144 and 311. See also Table 3.
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the most important commodity in the foreign trade of both countries. In China, exports of raw silk increased steadily after the
opening of the treaty ports. From 1868 to 1929, the year in which
silk exports reached their peak, shipments more than tripled,
rising from 3,420,000 kilograms to 11,400,000 kilograms. 4 As Table 1 shows, during the 1880s silk surpassed tea as China's major
export, and it continued to hold this position although its relative
proportion declined as China's trade became more diversified
during the Republican period (1912-1949). In 1880, silk exports
represented 38 per cent of Chinese exports by value, while in
1930, they accounted for only 16 per cent. In Japan, the expansion
of silk exports was even more dramatic, averaging about 656,000
kilograms per year in the 1868-1872 period, and soaring to 34,275,000 kilograms in 1929.5 Until the 1930s, raw silk was Japan's
leading export commodity, outranking tea, and silk was not surpassed by cotton fabrics until after the Depression. Between 1870
and 1930, raw silk held a steady 28 to 38 per cent ofJ a pan's total
exports, as Table 1 indicates. If silk fabric exports are added to
each country's figures, total silk exports from China represented
16.6 per cent of total exports by value, while total silk exports
from Japan represented 43.3 per cent of total Japanese exports
in 1929.6
TABLE l
RAW SILK AND TEA IN CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPORTS
(BY VALUE, IN PERCENTAGE)
China
Raw Silk
Tea

1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930

38
35
31
26
19
16

46
31
16
9
2
3

Japan
Raw Silk

38
35
36
28
29
28
33

Tea

25
22
9
4

3
0.9
0.6

Sources: For China, Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1922-31 (Shanghai, 1933) I, 120, 190.
For Japan, Miyohei Shinohara, .. Economic Development and Foreign Trade in Pre-war Japan," in C.D.
Cowan, ed., The Economic Development of China and Japan (London, 1964), 227. The figures given are
for 1868-72, 1878-82, 1888-92, 1898-1902, 1908-12, 1918-22, 1928-32.

• Tuan-Jiu Yang, Hou-pei Hou et al., comps., Statistics of China's Foreign Trade during the Last Sixtyfive Years (Nanking, 1931), 41, and Liang-Jin Hsiao,China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1974), 109-lll. I have deducted Hsiao's "Raw Silk, Miscellaneous" from his totals for "Total Raw
Silk" to make the latter consistent with Yang and Hou's figures for the earlier period. I have converted
piculs to kilograms. l picul=60 kilograms.
• G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modem Japan, 1867-1937 (London, 1946), 172. l kwan or
kan=3.75 kilograms.
8 Data for China from Lillian M. Li, China's Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modem World,
1842-1937 (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), Table 9, and Liang-lin Hsiao, China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 24,
109-lll. For Japan, see Takisawa Hideki, Nihon shihon shugi to sanshigyo (Tokyo, 1978), 79.

THE EAST ASIAN SILK TRADE

This content downloaded from
130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:30:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

195

The most notable aspect of the world silk trade was Japan's
stunning success in capturing the expanding world market from
China. Starting from a much smaller base, by 1907 Japan had overtaken China as the world's largest silk exporter, and according
to one estimate, by the early 1920s, Japan was supplying about
60 per cent of the silk traded internationally, while China was
providing only about 23 per cent.7 Table 2 shows the steep increase in Japanese silk exports and the gradual increase of
Chinese exports.
TABLE 2
CHINESE AND JAPANESE RAW SILK EXPORTS
(5-YEAR AVERAGES IN THOUSAND KILOGRAMS)

1871-1875
1876-1880
1881-1885
1886-1890
1891-1895
1896-1900
1901-1905
1906-1910
1911-1915
1916-1920
1921-1925
1926-1930
1931-1935

China

Japan

4,092
4,416
3,864
4,872
6,084
6,708
6,900
7,500
8,268
7,716
8,772
10,212
5,052

672
984
1,488
1,992
3,084
3,132
4,944
7,152
10,404
14,148
20,160
30,708
31,872

Source: Adapted from Table 16, Chapter III of Li, China's Silk Trade, 86--88.

Japan's success in the world market rested in its ability to
provide silk of consistent quality, The best Chinese product was
still superior, but the Japanese was more reliable, Standardization
was critical for the American silk weaving industry, which used
power looms, whereas the French, who still used hand-looms for
their high quality luxury silks, continued to buy domestically
reeled Tsatlees from China. Thus, the silk industry in Japan
developed to satisfy the needs of American manufacturers. The
portion of Japanese raw silk exports destined for American markets soared from less than 1 per cent in the mid-1860s to 84,2 per
cent in 1920, and to over 95 per cent in 1925--1926.8
7 Based on data provided by Union des Marchands de Soie de Lyon, Statistique de la production de la
soie en France et a l'etranger, 1880-1928 annual. Actual percentages for China and Japan may have been
even higher since this set of data compares Chinese and Japanese trade to European and other output
figures.
8 C.F. Remer, an economist, observed that ""Chinese raw silk is either excellent or rather poor in
quality .... Japanese raw silk is of more uniform quality, but the best Chinese silk is said to be superior
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Conversely, as American raw silk imports mounted steadily,
increasing more than tenfold from the 1890s to the 1930s, Japan's
share expanded until by the early 1930s it was supplying over
90 per cent of American needs, while the Chinese portion had
dropped to below 5 per cent (see Table 3). By the same token,
the American market never assumed such overwhelming importance for the Chinese silk industry. About 1920, for example, 39.4
per cent of silk exports from Shanghai were destined for France
or Great Britain, while only 32.9 per cent were destined for the
United States. At Canton, the American market was more important than the French until the late 1920s, when the proportions
became about the same as at Shanghai. 9
TABLE 3
UNITED STATES' RAW SILK IMPORTS, 1892-1935
(FIVE-YEAR AVERAGES)

Total

1892-1895
1896-1900
1901-1905
1906-1910
1911-1915
1916-1920
1921-1925
1926-1930
1931-1935

China
Amount
%age

Japan
Amount
%age

(l,000s kg.)

(l,000s kg.)

total

(l,000s kg.)

total

3,222
4,265
6,473
8,924
12,305
16,329
24,600
34,949
31,200

1,600
2,063
3,223
5,228
8,477
12,509
19,063
28,609
28,866

49.6
48.4
49.8
58.6
68.9
76.6
77.5
81.9
92.5

910
1,225
1,414
1,787
2,583
3,265
4,082
5,131
1,468

28.2
28.7
21.8
20.0
21.0
20.0
16.6
14.7
04.7

Source: Adapted from Sen'i kiigyo (Choki keizai tokei, vol. 11), comp. Fujino Shozaburo et al. (Tokyo,
1979), 309.

The success of Japan's silk export trade had profound significance for its general economic development. In concrete terms,
the development of a major export commodity enabled Japan to
earn the foreign exchange to purchase the machinery and raw
materials necessary for its industrialization. William W. Lockwood, an economist, has estimated that "the raw silk trade fito the Japanese product." The Foreign Trade of China (Shanghai, 1926), 140. Ishii Kanji,Nihon sanshigyiishi
bunseki (Tokyo, 1972), 41; and Charles Joseph Huber, The Raw Silk Industry of Japan (New York, 1929),
31, provide these trade statistics.
• China, Maritime Customs, Reports and Returns of Trade, annual until 1920; after 1920, Quarterly
Trade Returns. These data are summarized in Table 15, Chapter III of Li, China's Silk Trade. Data for
Canton can also he found in "Canton Exports of Raw Silk and Silk Waste in 1927," Chinese Economic
Journal 2:6 (June 1928), 529-532.
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nanced no less than 40 per cent ofJ a pan's entire imports of foreign
machinery and raw materials used domestically" between 1870
and 1930. Most other economists agree that foreign trade played
a critical role in Japan's economic development. Moreover, the
silk reeling industry ranked among the earliest modem enterprises in Japan, and in the words of the economist Kenzd Hemmi:
"the silk industry was a training school for Japanese industrialization." Silk and other export commodities gave Japanese entrepreneurs important opportunities for profitable investment,
and manufacturing for foreign markets imposed a clear need for
the standardization of products and more efficient commercial
organization. 10
Although silk was also China's major export commodity, and
although modern filatures-factories where silk was reeledwere among the earliest and most important modem industries,
the development of the silk industry did not have the same longterm significance in China that it did in Japan. Foreign trade in
general did not play a very large role in the Chinese economy,
and was barely tolerated by the Ch'ing government. The Chinese
silk industry was relatively more oriented toward its still substantial domestic market. Although estimates vary, the domestic
market may have consumed about 55-60 per cent of total raw silk
output during the early twentieth century. In Japan, however,
from 1883 to 1937, between 58 and 78 per cent of the raw silk
output was exported, usually well over 65 per cent in any given
year. 11
These differences however, are not sufficient to explain the
contrasting reactions of the Chinese and Japanese economies to
the same world trade opportunities. To a very large extent, their
different experiences with the silk trade typified their different
experiences with economic modernization in general.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SILK TECHNOLOGY

Silk manufacture had deep roots as a traditional handicraft in
China and Japan. Sericulture had been known in China since
10 William W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, expanded edition (Princeton, 1968), 94.
For opinions of other economists, see, for example, Miyohei Shinohara, "Economic Development and
Foreign Trade in Pre-War Japan," in C.D. Cowan, ed., The Economic Devel.opment of China and Japan
(London, 1964), 227; and Masao Baba and Masahiro Tatemono, "Foreign Trade and Economic Growth in
Japan: 1858-1937," in Lawrence Klein and Kazushi Ohkawa, eds., Economic Growth: The Japanese Experience since the Meiji Era (Homewood, Illinois, 1968), 162-182. Kenzo Hemmi, "Primary Exports and
Economic Development: The Case of Silk," in Kazushi Ohkawa et al., eds., Agriculture and Economic
Growth: Japan's Experience (Princeton, 1970), 308. The final point is made by Lockwood, 370-378.
11 Li, China's Silk Trade, 100-102; and Shinohara, "Economic Development," 226, compiled from Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and Ministry of Finance statistics. Domestic consumption of silk in Japan
also expanded markedly in these years. See Sen'i kogyo, 142.
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Picking Mulberry Leaves, an Early Step in Silk Production.
This and the other woodblock illustrations in this article are from
a well-known, Ch'ing dynasty work on agriculture and sericulture,
Yii-chih keng-chih t'u, comp. Chiao Ping-chen, 1696 ed.

prehistoric times; it also had ancient origins in Japan although
sericulture did not become widespread there until after 1600
during the early Tokugawa period. The manufacture of silk fabric
involved four basic steps: the cultivation of mulberry trees, the
raising of silkworms (sericulture), the reeling of silk from the
cocoons, and the weaving of raw silk into fabric. Between the
third and fourth steps occurred several intermediate processes
such as dyeing, twisting to form warp or woof, and in modern
times, rereeling to produce a more even strand of silk. Although
China's ancient silk export trade had consisted primarily of silk
fabrics, in the modern period European and American silk weaving companies demanded raw silk.
Many aspects of silk technology facilitated the industry's
growth in response to the world market during the nineteenth
century. First, mulberry trees were not soil-specific and were
often grown along the edges of fields or by the banks of ponds,
utilizing space that might otherwise have been wasted. Second,
THE EAST ASIAN SILK TRADE
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sericulture was an ideal rural side-occupation because it was
well-suited to small-scale domestic production. Traditionally, the
sericultural season was completed in the early spring before rice
was sown. Until relatively modern times, both Chinese and Japanese peasants raised only a spring crop of silkworms and were
free to deal with other farming tasks later. Sericulture thus took
advantage of seasonally underemployed labor. Moreover, although seasonal, sericulture required an intensive concentration
oflabor; women and children engaged in round-the-clock feeding
of the silkworms with mulberry leaves. A plentiful supply of rural
female labor in both China and Japan thus favored the expansion
of silk production. For a household to produce a few baskets of
cocoons and then reel off the silk usually meant a good supplementary income for a relatively small investment of capital. 12
Other aspects of sericulture, however, limited the extent and
rapidity with which silk production could expand. Above all,
sericulture involved a high degree of natural risk, and a whole
folklore grew up in China about the likes and dislikes of silkworms. It was true that slight changes in the weather or other
natural conditions could bring disaster. Indeed, the vulnerability
of silkworms became apparent during the mid-nineteenth century
in France and Italy, and later in China, when the problem of
disease became acute. According to contemporary estimates, by
the 1920s, 75 to 95 per cent of the silkworm egg-sheets sold in
China were diseased. 13
Sericulture also involved a high degree of commercial risk.
The peasant household faced an extremely volatile local market
that in turn reflected an even more unstable international market
governed by the whims of fashion, the constantly fluctuating
exchange rate, and the uncertain supply each season. The concentration of sericulture into one brief season further exacerbated
the risks of the market since most domestically reeled silk was
sold at the same time each spring. Peasant producers were at the
mercy of the prevailing market price. After steam filatures were
established in China, peasant households that sold their cocoons
rather than reeling them at home were even more vulnerable,
for the cocoon business was even more speculative than the raw
silk market. As a result, in the absence of institutional safeguards,
the peasant household could not afford to commit very much of
its financial resources to sericulture; in other words, it would not
The following discussion is summarized from Chapter I of Li, China's Silk Trade.
" The Silk Association of America and the Shanghai International Testing House, comp., A Survey of
the Silk Industry of Central Chino (Shanghai, 1925), 8-9.
12
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risk hiring outside help, or devoting all of its land to growing
mulberry trees. The volume of cocoon or silk production was
thus constrained by the amount of labor readily available in the
household. In short, sericulture was an ideal secondary occupation for the peasant household, but it was often too risky to
undertake as a primary occupation.
"Modernization" of the silk industry, as narrowly conceived,
involved the introduction of steam-powered reeling machines
and factory organization. In many instances in both China and
Japan, however, these technological and organizational steps
alone did not ensure commercial success. "Modernization," as
more broadly conceived, meant the introduction of a variety of
technological and institutional changes that substantially reduced
the natural and commercial risks inherent in the manufacture of
silk, and so permitted the industry to expand. In Japan, silkworm
disease was brought under control through mandatory inspection
of silkworm eggs, standardized production, and eventually the
licensing of egg producers. With the gradual introduction of summer and autumn crops of worms, sericulture became almost a
year-round enterprise, and this helped to reduce its speculative
character. Constant scientific experimentation led to the development of better silkworm strains and higher yields for mulberry
trees and cocoons, as well as eggs. On the commercial side, organization of rural cooperatives helped cushion the risk to individual peasants. At a later stage, better organization and vertical
integration of production by steam filature companies helped to
reduce the risk to entrepreneurs. In China, by contrast, even after
steam filatures were introduced, commerical risks for entrepreneurs and peasants alike remained high in the absence of basic
reform of financing. Sericultural schools and experimental stations were not widely established until the 1920s and 1930s, too
late to be effective. In the meantime not only had silkworm disease become rampant, but yields of mulberry and cocoons remained, at very best, stagnant. 14
THE CHINESE PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT

The deteriorating technological standards in Chinese silk manufacture, as well as the government's failure to assume greater
14 KenzO Hemmi stresses the importance of constant technological improvement in maintaining the
relative profitability of mulberry as opposed to other crops in Japan, "Primary Product Export," 318-321.
Since tbe Meiji era, tbe yields of silk from cocoons have more than doubled in Japan. Li, China's Silk Trade,
Chapter 1. In fact, tbe data in Ch' en Heng-Ii, Pu Nung-shu yen-chiu (Peking, 1958), strongly suggest a steady
decline in yields from tbe late Ming to tbe 1950s.

THE EAST ASIAN SILK TRADE

This content downloaded from
130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:30:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

201

responsibility in promoting the industry, seem remarkable in
view of China's historical pre-eminence in silk products and the
government's traditional vested interest in providing silks for its
own needs. From ancient times, demand generated by the imperial court, both for tribute purposes and for its own consumption, had provided the main stimulus for the growth of the silk
industry. Since the Southern Sung period (1127-1278), China's
main silk-producing region had been the lower Yangtze valley,
particularly the northern prefectures of Chekiang province bordering Lake T' ai. This was the most prosperous region of the
country, and the concentration of imperial silk weaving factories
there during the Ming (1368-1644) and the Ch'ing (1644-1911)
dynasties further stimulated production in the countryside. During the late Ming and early Ch'ing, sericultural technology
reached unprecedented heights, and the silks from this area were
highly prized.15
By the time treaty ports were opened to trade with the West
in the mid-nineteenth century, however, continued technological
improvement had largely come to an end although the silk trade
in the lower Yangtze, or Kiangnan, area was still flourishing. The
sericultural manuals of this period were essentially based on
those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Since the imperial factories were in a serious decline, raw silk was diverted
to the export trade without causing serious domestic dislocation.
After 1842, the locus of the export trade shifted quickly from
Canton, where it had previously been relatively small in volume,
to Shanghai, where it was closer to the main sericultural districts.
The steady expansion of silk exports from Shanghai, however,
was interrupted by the Taiping rebellion, which devastated many
silk-growing localities.
After the rebellion, there was rapid recovery in Kiangnan. Sericulture was introduced into many new localities in this region,
particularly in the southern prefectures of Kiangsu province north
of Lake T' ai. The period from about 1870 to 1895 in the Kiangnan
area could be described as a period of economic growth without
technological change. Although attempts to establish steam filatures at Shanghai began as early as 1862, they were, with one
or two exceptions, unsuccessful. Virtually all silk produced and
exported continued to be reeled in simple hand or treadle machines in peasant homes. Not until the 1890s did mechanized
reeling begin to play an important role at Shanghai. Thereafter,
15
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These developments are more extensively discussed in Li, China's Silk Trade, Chapter IV.
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Sorting Worms, an Intermediate Step in Silk Production.

steam filature silk quickly assumed a leading role in the silk
export picture. In 1895 steam filature silk represented only about
12 per cent of total silk exports from Shanghai, but in 1925 it
represented about 99 per cent. 16
A kind of commercial dualism emerged in Kiangnan whereby
the silk produced by the modernized sector of the industry supplied the export trade, while the silk produced by the traditional
sector continued to supply the domestic market, which remained
substantial. The domestic silk weaving industry in Soochow,
Nanking, and Hangchow recovered from the Taiping rebellion,
and even experienced a small boom during and after World War
I. The economic dualism also expressed itself geographically.
Since the modern sector was concentrated at Shanghai, and later
Wusih, it was isolated from its rural base and its source of cocoons.
In Kiangnan, the old sericultural districts in northern Chekiang
continued to produce domestically reeled silk, while the new
16 Based on figures from H.D. Fong, "China's Silk Reeling Industry," Monthly Bulletin on Economic
China (Nankai Institute of Economics), Vll:I2 (December 1934), 491, Table V.
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districts in southern Kiangsu produced cocoons for the filatures
to reel. 17
In the Canton delta, the second silk region to assume major
importance in the export trade, a different pattern of growth
emerged. The Kwangtung region had not been as large a producer
of silks for the domestic market before 1842 as Kiangnan had
been. With the expanded opportunities for foreign trade after
1842, sericulture spread rapidly in the delta region. Because it
was largely oriented toward the foreign market, the silk industry
in Kwangtung adopted steam filatures earlier than in Kiangnan.
Although the first few pioneering efforts met with local opposition, machine-reeled silk came to dominate the export picture
during the 1880s. In 1882, filature silk was only 13.1 per cent of
all silk exports, but by 1895 it had grown to 90 per cent. Thereafter,
virtually all silk exports were filature products. 18
The warmer climate of Kwangtung permitted the raising of
seven crops of silkworms each year, thus eliminating the seasonal
problems that existed in Kiangnan. Because the domestic market
was less significant, the problem of economic dualism was
avoided. Moreover, since filatures were located in the countyside,
close to the source of cocoons, Kwangtung also escaped the problem of geographical dualism. Nevertheless, despite all the advantages of Kwangtung over the Kiangnan region, the Cantonese
silk industry could hardly be termed a success. Foreigners described the filatures as being dirty and inefficient, using backward
machinery and defective cocoons. Thus, while modernization in
the narrow technological sense occurred earlier and more completely in the Canton delta, modernization in the larger sense
did not take place. 19
THE JAPANESE PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT

The Japanese pattern of development differed from the Chinese
in several respects. First, in Japan the opening of trade with the
West coincided with a period of rapid growth and innovation in
sericulture, whereas in China it coincided with a period of technological stagnation and decline of official demand. The expan17 In 1925, 81 per cent of the cocoon output of Kiangsu was sold to filatures, whereas only 18 per cent
of the Chekiang output was. See The Silk Association of America,A Survey of the Silk Industry, 5-6, 93.
18 Suzuki Tomoo, .. Shinmatsu Minsho ni okeru minzoku shihon no tenkai katei: Kanton no seishigyO ni
tsuite," Toyo shigaku ronshu VI (1960), 47-49; Imperial Maritime Customs, Decennial Reports, 1882-1891,
and 1892-1901, as reproduced in Shih Min-hsiung, The Silk Industry in Ch'ing China, tr. by E-tu Zen Sun
(Center for Chinese Studies, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1976), 17.
19 Leo Duran,Raw Silk: A Practical Handbook for the Buyer, 2nd ed. (New York, 1921), 147; and Charles
Walter Howard and K.P. Buswell, A Survey of the Silk Industry of South China (Hong Kong, 1925), 144.
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sion of sericulture in Japan during the Tokugawa period
(1600-1867) was directly related to political circumstances. During the seventeenth century, imports of raw silk from China had
mounted, creating an imbalance of trade that greatly alarmed the
Tokugawa Bakufu, which in 1685 imposed a quota reducing imports to about one-third of the current level. Despite the official
sumptuary regulations against the indiscriminate wearing of silks,
the domestic demand for silk continued to grow, and the weaving
industry, centered at Nishijin in Kyoto, needed new sources of
raw materials. Consequently, the Bakufu encouraged the promotion of sericulture by various han governments, and employed
such inducements as financial incentives, the distribution of
mulberry seeds and silkworm eggs, and the publication of sericultural manuals. By the late Tokugawa period, sericulture had
been introduced to most parts of Japan, except in the North. 20
These efforts produced striking results. By the mid-nineteenth
century, the Japanese had not only caught up with the Chinese
in silk technology, but had begun to experiment with some techniques yet unknown in China. The zaguri, or "sitting," type of
reeling machine, already widespread in China, was introduced
in Gumma and Fukushima, and marked a distinct advance over
the hand-operated machines previously used in Japan. Other
technological improvements included the cold storage of eggs
and the development of summer and fall crops of worms. Although Chinese techniques were still on the whole more advanced, there is no evidence of such a high level of innovative
activity in China in the period just before the opening of the
treaty ports. Moreover, in Japan these technological changes were
accompanied by changes in the organization of production. As
early as the mid-eighteenth century, for example, reeling was
separated from sericulture in Gumma prefecture where workshops were established outside the household. In China such
separation of functions did not occur until the advent of steam
filatures. 21
In the 1850s and 1860s, with the opening of the treaty ports,
several new centers of sericulture emerged. Fukushima and
•• Taikei Nihonshi sosho, comp. Yamakawa shuppansha (Tokyo, 1965), Xl, 91, 278; also Yagi Haruo,
"Seishigyo," in Nihon sangyoshi taikei: Soron hen (Tokyo, 1961), I, 223; and also Fujimoto Jitsuya, Nihon
sanshigyoshi (Tokyo, 1933), I, 147-179 passim. Taikei Nihonshi sosho, Xl, 56-51.
11 The sericultural manuals in the early Tokugawa period were largely based on Chinese works, but
those of the mid-Tokugawa period were often based on Japanese technological innovations. Uchida Hoshimi,
Nihon boshoku gijitsu no rekishi (Tokyo, 1960), 54-55. The names used here are those of current prefectures.
Traditionally, Oshu corresponded roughly to Fukushima, Joshu to Gumma, and Shinshu to Nagano. A
summer crop was developed in Nagano in the 1830s. Nihon sanshigyo taikei, comp. Todai shuppansha
(Tokyo, 1961), V, 186. For discussion of otherTokugawatechnologicaladvances, see Yagi Haruo, "'SeishigyO,"
240; and Uchida Hoshimi, Nihon boshoku gijitsu no rekishi, 57-66. Nihon sanshigyo taikei, IV, 260-261,
and Yagi Haruo, "Seishigyo," 227.
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Gumma prefectures, the traditional sources of the best raw silk,
were now joined by Nagano, Gifu, and Yamanashi. The manufacture of egg-cards for export to Europe flourished in this period.
Local entrepreneurs disseminated knowledge of sericultural
techniques. Fukushima and Gumma, among other places, further
adopted the workshop form of production. In this period innovations took place within the framework of traditional technology,
but after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, a mixed pattern of traditional and modem production began to emerge. In the 1870s
several pioneering attempts at establishing steam filatures were
made, the most important of which was the government model
factory, the Tomioka, built in Gumma prefecture in 1872. This
project was directed by a French expert working with eighteen
European assistants and the latest foreign machinery. Although
ultimately a business failure, the Tomioka set an important example, and its staff members were dispatched to give instruction
in other localities wanting modem technology. 22
The actual spread of steam filatures was, however, rather slow.
Many enterprises classified as "factories" were in fact workshops
having only ten to thirty workers. The form of energy used in
these early workshops was water-power, not steam, which characterized the large-scale European-style filatures. The adoption
of Western technology was a complex process, with various regions responding differently. In Gumma and Fukushima, for example, Western technology was accepted later and with greater
difficulty than in the newer silk districts such as Nagano. In
Gumma, especially, traditional technology was improved to produce kairyozaguri ito, domestically reeled silk that was rereeled
to produce a more even thread. This type of silk was used in
France and Italy as woof. The high-quality silk produced by
modem steam filatures, and necessary for warp-threads, did not
have a large foreign demand until the American market became
important in the 1890s.23
Not until the turn of the century did modern machine-reeling
assume the dominant role in the production of silk. These modem
22 For a description in English of entrepreneurial activity in Saitama-ken, see William Jones Chambliss,
Chiaraijima Village: Land Tenure, Taxation, and Local Trade, 1818-1884 (Tucson, Arizona, 196.5), 17-22.
Regarding workshop production, see, Taikei Nihonshi siisho, XII, 60. On the Tomioka factory, see Ohara
Keishi,]apanese Trade and Industry in the Meiji-Taisho Era (Tokyo, 1957), 229-233; and Thomas C. Smith,
Political Change and Industrial Development in]apan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880 (Stanford, Calif.,
1955), 58-61.
23 Taikei Nihoruhi siisho, XII, 226-229. Yoshida Kazuko, "Meiji shoko no seishi gijitsu ni okeru dochaku
to gairai," Kagakushi kenkyu, 11:16 (Spring, 1977), 19, and Ebato Akira, Sanshigyo no keizai chirigakuteki
kenkyu (Tokyo, 1969). Ohara Keishi,]apanese Trade and Industry, 243-249. Yagi Haruo, "Seishigyo," 240,
notes that the Japanese technique was yet unknown in Europe or China. In Kiangnan, rereeled silk did not
become an important export item until the 1910s. Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyiishi bunseki, 57-83. His
analysis of the financing of the silk industry is based on the difference between these two types of silk,
which he terms Type I and Type II. See note 42 below.
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filatures were larger in scale than the previous workshops or
factories, and they increasingly used steam power. After the
1910s, two giant companies, the Katakura and the Gunze, dominated the machine-reeling industry, spreading out from their
respective bases in Nagano and the Kansai region to establish
branch factories elsewhere. In 1900, only 52 per cent of Japan's
total output of raw silk was machine-reeled, but by 1925 this
figure had increased to over 87 per cent, including virtually all
exported silk. Though largely mechanized and factory-organized,
the Japanese silk industry nevertheless retained its small-scale
character. In 1926, for example, 36 per cent of all filatures had
fewer than 50 basins; 66 per cent had fewer than 100 basins. 24
In comparison with the Chinese pattern, the development of
the Japanese silk industry was smoother and more successful,
but also more complex and diverse. Although some differences
between old and new areas did exist in the early Meiji years, on
the whole there was not the stark dualism between old and new,
traditional and modern, rural and urban that tended to characterize the Chinese experience. The Japanese silk industry was
geographically more extensive than the Chinese, with some silk
being produced by almost all the prefectures by the Taisho period, and only Nagano and Aichi producing more than 10 per
cent of the total. In China, by contrast, the impact of the silk
export trade was limited to a few regions, primarily the lower
Yangtze valley and the Canton delta. Furthermore, in Japan technological modernization was incremental and small-scale; the
dramatic changes associated with big-factory production did not
take place for several decades. 25
URBAN-RURAL INTEGRATION

In order to develop successfully, the modern silk-reeling industry had to be well-integrated with its rural base. In Japan,
sericulture not only became quite extensive across regions, but
also became a crucial source of income for many peasant families.
14 Taikei Nihonshi sosho, XII, 399-401. Some Japanese filatures also used electric power. See Sen'i
kogyo, 179-180. Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyoshi bunseki, 88; Ohara Keishi,]apanese Trade and Industry,
275-276. Japanese figures for 1900 and 1925 based on output data in Sen'i kogyo, 294-295, which does not
include waste silk. According to Nihon sen'i sangyoshi, comp. Nihon sen'i kyogikai (Osaka, 1958), I, 942,
only 75 per cent of total output in 1925 was machine-reeled if waste silk is included. For export data, see
Nihon boeki seiran, comp. Toyo keizai shimposha (reprint, Tokyo, 1975), 53--55; and also Sen'i kogyo, 308.
Regarding the small-scale character of the Japanese industry, see, Huber, Raw Silk Industry, 42.
u For Japan, see pp. 41-42, and map (end fold-out) in Huber, Raw Silk Industry, and also Sen'i kogyo
139. For China, see Li, China's Silk Trade, Chapter IV. In the Republican period, wild silk, known as

Tussah, from Shantung and Manchuria, became extremely popular for export. The provinces of Szechwan
and Hupei also produced a substantial amount of raw silk, but mostly inferior yellow silk for the domestic
market.
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Although it is estimated that at the height of its development in
the 1920s, 32-40 per cent or more of all Japanese farm families
were engaged in sericulture, in the more specialized areas such
as Yamanashi, close to 90 per cent of farm families engaged in
sericulture, and as much as 56 per cent of the total value of their
crops came from sericulture, as opposed to rice or cash crops. In
China, by contrast, only in one exceptionally specialized sericultural district in the Canton delta did silk income form as much
as 80 per cent of farm income. In the relatively specialized areas
of Kiangnan, surveys show no more than 20-40 per cent of farm
income derived from sericulture, and in the average non-specialized area, income from sericulture could be considered only
supplementary. 26
Another distinctive characteristic of the Japanese silk industry
was the extent to which it retained its rural character.27 Rural
entrepreneurs and laborers, as well as rural capital, played important roles in the development of the industry. In some areas,
ex-samurai were the leading entrepreneurs. 28 In many areas, landlords ordered their tenants to plant mulberry and raise silkworms.29 Moreover, filatures in the countryside drew on an abundant and cheap supply oflabor: the daughters of peasant families.
These woman provided extra income for their families; yet they
remained part of the rural scene and could return to other pursuits
during the slack season.30 In the older areas, silk-raising families
were not really hurt by the loss of income from domestic reeling,
for they could make it up through their daughters' wages.
Even with the increase in steam filatures, the rural and urban
sectors of the silk industry remained well-integrated. Filatures
were relatively small and they were well-distributed through the
rural silk districts and towns, giving them more opportunity to
26 Sen'i kogyo, 306; and Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan, 45, for Japan in general. Data for
Yamanashi prefecture is from Yamanashi-ken tOkeisho and has been generously shared with me by Professor
Richard J. Smethurst, who is preparing a manuscript on tenancy disputes in that area. For data on the value
of sericultural products in total agricultural production, see Umemura Mataji et al., comps., Noringyo (Choki
keizai tokei, vol. 9) (Tokyo, 1966), 146-149. For data on mulberry acreage, see Sen'i kogyo, 306-307. Data
on China from Chapter V, Table 25 of Li, China's Silk Trade.
27 Johannes Hirschmeier, The Origins of Entrepreneurship in Meiji japan (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 95,
makes this point, as do others. The continuing strength of the rural sector in the Japanese silk industry,
even into the twentieth century, is at least one reason to be cautious about adopting the commonly held
view that Japan had evolved a "dual economy" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in
which the traditional-rural sector of the economy experienced a declining rate of growth, while the modemurban sector advanced quickly. This idea is best expressed by Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovslcy, in
"A Century of Japanese Economic Growth," in William W. Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in japan (Princeton, 1965), 47-92, where they characterize the period 1906-1930 as one in which
a differential structure was created.
28 For example, in Gumma. Nihon sanshigyo taikei, IV, 277-278.
29 For example, in Yamanashi. See Nakamura Masanori, .. Seishigy0 no tenkai to jinushisei." Shakai keizei
shigaku, 32 (1967), 46-71.
30 Allen, Short Economic History, 110. On the low wages of filature employees in Yamanashi, see Arion
Tussing, "The Labor Force in Meiji Economic Growth: A Quantitative Study of Yamanashi Prefecture,"
Journal of Economic History, XXVI:l (March 1966), 70-96.

208

BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW

This content downloaded from
130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:30:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Reeling Silk, the Third Step in the
Production of Silk Fabric.

secure an adequate supply of cocoons. Cocoons represented
about 80 per cent of the operating costs of a filature, and their
quality was the single most important factor in determining the
success of an enterprise. For example, a key reason for the failure
of the model filature established in 1871 in Tsukiji, a district of
Tokyo, was its inability to secure good cocoons. With the advent
of the large-scale filature companies, it became increasingly common for filatures to distribute silkworm eggs to peasants-an even
more effective way of insuring the quality of the cocoon supply. 31
The strength of the rural sector was an inheritance from the
Tokugawa period. The rural-centered commercial growth of the
early modern period-which had no distinct parallel in Ch'ing
China-reflected the_ waning control of the Bakufu over the countryside and the decline of the economic leadership of the cities.
In the view of the historian Thomas C. Smith, the modern textile
industry was derived from this formative pre-modern experience.
31 The Silk Association of America, A Survey of the Silk Industry, 2; Ohara Keishi,Japanese Trade and
Industry, 276. Yoshida Kazuko, "Meiji shoko no seihi gijitsu ni okeru dochaku to gairai," 17-18. Ishii Kanji,
Nihon sanshigyDshi bunseki, 422ff.
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"The modern textile industry," he wrote, "grew mainly in districts of traditional manufacture; much of the growth occurred in
villages and former 'country-places'; entrepreneurs, plant managers, buyers, shippers and labour contractors came from these
same districts; and labour came overwhelmingly from farm families." 32
The formation of various types of rural cooperatives helped silk
producers overcome the disadvantages of small-scale and atomized production. As early as the 1870s and 1880s, silk reelers'
cooperatives undertook the weighing, packing, and shipping of
silk to Yokohama. Although the Gumma prefecture's "improved"
silk reelers' attempt at forming a federation of such cooperatives
in 1880 was unsuccessful, later attempts did succeed. By the end
of the Meiji period, small filatures with relatively little leverage
in negotiating loans for the purchase of cocoons joined together
in kumi, or unions, to obtain financing from Yokohama wholesalers. By the Taisho period, peasant producers of cocoons organized themselves into village-wide unions in order to deal with
the filatures more effectively. With government support, the cocoon unions formed federations within each prefecture, and a
nationwide federation appeared in the early Showa period. 33
Cooperatives were an especially effective form of organization
for silk production because they provided some economic centralization of a technologically decentralized productive process
and gave the vulnerable peasant producers some leverage. As G.
C. Allen and Audrey Donnithorne observed in their study of
Western enterprise in East Asia, the silk trade for its successful
organization "needed a high degree of centralization at some
points and wide dispersion at others." It was in most branches
"necessarily a small scale industry [dependent] for its success on
central supervision and government intervention at a few key
points." The marketing of cocoons was one such point. In China
cooperatives were not even the subject of experiments until the
1930s-when the world silk trade was already in decline. 34
In the Kiangnan region of China, the problem of rural-urban
integration was particularly pronounced. Steam filatures, being
32 Thomas C. Smith, "Pre-Modem Economic Growth: Japan and the West," Past and Present, 60 (August
1973), 158. The shift from urban-centered marketing to town and village-centered commerce in the cotton
industry is described in William B. Hauser,Economic Institutional Change in Tokugawa japan: Osaka and
the Kinai Cotton Trade (Cambridge, England, 1974), Chaps. VI and VII.
33 Yagi Haruo,Nihon keizaishigaisetsu (Tokyo, 1974), 217; also Yamaguchi Kazuo,Nihon sangyo kinyushi
kenkyu, 10-11. Nihon sanshigyo taikei, IV, 280-283; and Ohara Keishi,Japanese Trade and Industry, 244249 and 292-294. Also, Huher, Raw Silk Industry, 17.
34 G.C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithome, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development
(London, 1954), 68. The most famous silk cooperative in China is well-described by Fei Hsiao-t'ung, in his
Peasant Life in China (London, 1939).
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concentrated at Shanghai, and later at Wusih, were institutionally
as well as geographically remote from the rural sector. Moreover,
the urban filatures tended to be large-scale enterprises, which
made them greater risks to operate. Without any base in the rural
areas, the filatures depended on rural cocoon hongs to provide
their cocoon supply. The hongs bought cocoons from local peasants, dried them, and shipped them to warehouses or filatures
at Shanghai. They were usually financed by local businessmen
and contracted to a filature or cocoon broker. Although the price
of cocoons soared when filatures were established, their quality
deteriorated since the peasants no longer had a stake in the reeling process. The peasant households could not defend themselves against commercial fluctuations by withholding their cocoons from the annual spring market since the moths would break
through the cocoons within ten days unless the cocoons were
dried. In addition, the location of the filatures in the cities meant
that peasants were denied the potential income their daughters
might have earned if the factories were nearby. 35
There were two major reasons for the rural-urban split in the
Kiangnan area. First, the silk weaving industry strongly opposed
the growth of the raw silk export trade and particularly the modern
filatures associated with the trade. Fearing a further rise in the
price of raw silk, the weaving interests prevailed upon the Chekiang and Kiangsu provincial governments to limit the number of
cocoon hongs in each locality. Such legislation, although sometimes ignored, was not repealed until the late 1920s. In Japan,
the traditional weaving centers at Nishijin in Kyoto, and Kiryii
in Gumma, also experienced great difficulty, but they did not
have the political strength to resist the momentum toward foreign
trade. Second, the weakness of the Ch'ing government permitted
Shanghai and the other treaty ports to dominate the development
of modern enterprises. Shanghai, in particular, had all the advantages of extraterritorial protection, access to financing and
shipping, and immunity from arbitrary taxation. Wusih' s emergence as a subsidiary center of steam filatures in the Kiangnan
area did not begin until after World War I, when political unrest
at Shanghai caused concern, and the advantages of Wusih' s location in a major sericultural district became apparent. 36
In the Canton delta, urban-rural integration was not such a
problem since the filatures were located in the countryside, and
•• Sanshigyo dogyokumiai chiiokai, comp., Shina sanshigyo taikan (Tokyo, 1929), 235-236, shows that
the average size of filatures in the Kiangnan area was 261 basins. The ones in Canton tended to be larger.
The institution of the cocoon hong is discussed in Li, China's Silk Trade, Chapter VI.
38 Li, China's Silk Trade, Chapter VI. Taikei Nihonshi sosho, XII, 56-57.
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factory workers were local peasant girls and women. The potential advantages of Canton as a treaty port were out-weighed by
the convenience of a rural location. "Native," as opposed to foreign, capital also played a larger role in the early Canton filatures,
although in fact the silk industry at Shanghai too was largely a
Chinese business except in the early years. Nevertheless, the
Canton filatures also did not have direct control over their cocoon
supply and depended on cocoon markets and cocoon merchants.
This suggests that while they were not geographically separated
from rural sericulture, Canton filatures were almost as institutionally separated as their Shanghai counterparts. Better urbanrural integration was not enough to compensate for another critical weakness. 37
COMMERCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES

A pervasive scarcity of capital was a weakness that was felt by
all segments of the Chinese silk industry and that was reflected
in the way the silk trade was organized. The export trade operated
within the framework of pre-existing commercial practices. The
traditional organization of internal silk commerce was highly specialized in function, but very decentralized. Each stage in silk
manufacturing-from the marketing of mulberry saplings to the
embroidering of brocades-was controlled by a series of middlemen or brokers whose function was exchange, not production.
With the opening of trade with the West, this chain of middlemen
was simply lengthened by one or two links. Peasants in the silk
districts sold their reeled product to the local silk hong, which
in turn sold the silk to a Shanghai broker with whom it generally
had some long-term working relationship. The Shanghai brokers
then sold the silk to Western export firms. 38
The export trade itself was entirely in the hands of Western
firms, but they did not, indeed could not, interfere with the internal commercial network that remained firmly under Chinese
control. The Shanghai silk brokers formed the crucial link between Western merchants and Chinese producers. Numbering
about fifty during the 1920s, these brokers were extremely pow31 Suzuki Tomoo, "Shinmatsu Minsho," 62. Also, Marianne Bastid, "Le Developpement des filatures de
soie modernes dans la province du Guangdong avant 1894," The Polity and Economy of China: The Late
Professor Yuji Muramatsu Commemoration Volume (Tokyo, 1975), 175-188, discusses the issue of native
capital.
38 There is debate among scholars about whether the scarcity of capital invested in modem enterprises
was due to an absolute scarcity, or to the unwillingness of individua1s to risk investment of their wealth in
new enterprises. On middlemen, see, Li, China~s Silk Trade, Chapter V. Horie Eiichi, Shina sanshigyO ni
okeru torihiki kanko (Tokyo, 1941), 129-131. Shina shobetsu zensho, comp. by Toa dobunkai (Tokyo,
1917-1920), XIII, 600-601; XV, 735-736.
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erful, often serving in dual roles as compradores to Western firms,
and as independent businessmen. They were the masters of the
silk trade. Each brokerage had its own "chop" and reputation to
maintain. 39
This system worked satisfactorily until the advent of filatures,
when traditional business procedures were extended to the new
institutions, though not successfully. The Shanghai filatures
were frequently undercapitalized, and numerous ventures failed.
The shortage of capital accentuated the decentralized organization of the silk business. The filature companies did not own
their own physical plants. Instead, they rented plants from real
estate owners when the season looked promising. Some filatures
did not operate in bad seasons. Thus, the companies had no fixed
capital and little long-term risk. The cocoon hongs in Kiangnan
also operated on a seasonal basis and did not have their own fixed
plants. At Canton, clans or families frequently built filatures to
rent out. The cocoon markets were owned by one set of local
landlords or merchants and operated by another. The effect of
these practices on the quality of the equipment and the final
product was hardly beneficial, and it exacerbated the speculative
aspects of the silk business. 40
While the need for fixed capital was thus minimized, a substantial amount of operating capital was needed each spring to
purchase cocoons-an estimated $75,000,000 per season at
Shanghai. The ch'ien-chuang, or "native" banks, became the
chief financial backers of the cocoon hongs, as well as of the
filatures. After making a contract with a cocoon hong, a ch' ienchuang would send a man to the silk district to pay the money
and supervise the shipment of cocoons to Shanghai where they
were stored in a designated warehouse. Foreign exporters were
also directly and indirectly involved in the financing of cocoon
purchases and filatures, but for the most part the silk industry
remained in Chinese hands. 41
In Japan, by contrast, silk export development coincided with
a period of transformation of economic institutions. Some
changes-such as the gradual abolition of the kabu-nakama, or
trade associations-had been initiated during the Tokugawa period. In the silk trade, this cleared the way for different social
groups to emerge as rural entrepreneurs. Recent studies claim
•• Tseng T'ung-ch'un, Chung-kuo ssu-yeh (Shanghai, 1933), 96-97; and Ralph E. Buchanan, The Shanghai
Raw Silk Market (New York, 1929), 24-28.
40 Shina shobetsu zensho, XV, 685-688. Howard and Buswell, A Survey of the Silk Industry, 121; Li,
China's Silk Trade, Chapter VI. Suzuki Tomoo, .. Shinmat:su Minsho," 62.
41 Buchanan, The Shanghai Raw Silk Market, 1. Yueh Ssu-ping, Chung-kuo ts'an-ssu (Shanghai, 1935),
110-111, 201-202.

THE EAST ASIAN SILK TRADE

This content downloaded from
130.58.34.24 on Fri, 06 Aug 2021 14:30:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

213

Weaving Silk on a Draw-Loom.

that social structure was an important factor in determining the
receptivity of a locality to innovations. Nagano, for example, was
quicker to accept foreign technology than Gumma, in part because merchants and peasants were more influential in the former, while officials exercised stronger influence in the latter.
Like the Wusih area of Kiangnan, Nagano possessed the advantages of newness with respect to silk production. By contrast,
Fukushima, which had been the major supplier of raw silk to
Nishijin in the Tokugawa period, did not flourish in the export
trade precisely because of the presence of old commercial groups
with vested interests. Later, the large-scale filatures tended to
cluster in new sericultural areas, such as Yamagata, Aichi, Mie,
and Kyoto. Unlike the comparable areas in China, the old sericultural areas in Japan did not pose an obstacle to the general
development and spread of sericulture to the rest of the country. 42
42 See Hauser, Economic Institutional Change, 47-48, on the abolition of the kabu-nakama during the
Kansei reforms; and Taikei Nihon sOsho, XII, 55, 240. On peasants, see Taikei, XI, 91, and XII, 55,240; on
ex-samurai, see Ibid., XII, 191-194, and Hirschmeier, Origins, 93-94. On differences between Nagano and
Gumma, see, Yoshida Kazuko, "Meiji," 19. Regional differences are also explored in Ebato Akira, SanshigyO
no keizai chirigakuteki kenkyU. On vested interests, see Yagi Haruo, Nihon kindai seishigyO no seiritsuNagano-ken Okaya seishigy0shi, 10-lL According to Ishii Kanji's analysis, the new districts produced what
he calls Type I silk, factory-reeled silk of high quality. See Nihon sanshigyoshi bunseki, 62.
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The most important new institution associated with the silk
industry was that of the Yokohama wholesaler, or urikomitonya.
During the Meiji period there were twenty to thirty of these
tonya, four of whom together accounted for about 75 per cent of
the business transacted by the brokerages. The basic function of
the Yokohama wholesaler was to mediate between the rural silk
producers and the silk exporters at Yokohama. Beginning in the
late 1880s, the wholesalers also began to finance the operations
of small filatures, mostly of the semi-modernized variety. They
extended to these filatures working capital to purchase cocoons.
They also worked with these enterprises to organize group purchases of cocoons and other cooperative ventures designed to
lower costs. The Yokohama brokers were extremely powerful,
and they became extremely wealthy through profits earned by
their consignment fees and from financing loans. 43
Unlike the compradores of Shanghai, whose strongestties were
to the treaty port itself, the Yokohama wholesalers often came
from the rural areas. Maebashi and other Gumma merchants became Yokohama dealers. Although there were superficial similarities between the Shanghai brokers and Yokohama wholesalers, the Japanese silk merchants played a more dynamicsome would say more oppressive-role in developing the silk
trade. They were much more active agents of change than the
Shanghai brokers. For example, the Yokohama dealers themselves spearheaded the movement toward standardized inspection of silk exports. 44
In the long run, however, the movement toward direct export
led to the decline of the influence of the Yokohama brokers.
Japanese companies eventually began to take the lead over foreign firms in the export trade. In 1888, for example, Japanese
firms handled only about 8 per cent of silk exports, but by 1912,
this had increased to over 53 per cent. The large filature companies also engaged in direct exporting to their Western customers, and their financial resources exceeded those of the wholesalers. Katakura, for example, owned nine egg manufacturing
stations, fifty-four filatures, testing laboratories in Yokohama and
the rural districts, and had a branch office in New York after
World War I. Thus these large firms engaged in the vertical integration of the silk industry, while rural cooperatives, where
they existed, provided a form of horizontal integration. 45
.. Yamaguchi Kazuo., Nihon sangyo kinyushi kenkyu, 8-9 and 25-34. Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyoshi
bunseki, 373,413. Ohara Keishi,]apanese Trade and Industry, 276-281.
"Yagi Haruo, "Seishigyo," 233. Yamaguchi Kazuo, Nihon sangyo, 10.
.. Yokohama shishi (Tokyo, 1961), IIIA, 633. Maeda Masana and Kawaze Hideharu both were active in
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The growing role oflocal and city banks in financing silk transactions also contributed to the decline of the Yokohama wholesalers. Since the establishment of the Yokohama Specie Bank in
1880 and the Bank of Japan in 1882, commercial banks were able
to assist the wholesalers in extending credit to silk reelers. Local
banks generally lent money only when the Yokohama wholesalers
did so. By the first decade of the twentieth century, bank loans
represented about 75 per cent of silk financing, and wholesalers'
loans about 25 per cent. The growth of the banking system was
a critical factor in encouraging the flow of capital into the silk
business, but the silk trade also contributed to the development
of Japanese banking. Certainly, the development of a modern
banking system at an early date distinguished the Japanese modern experience from the Chinese. Behind the banking system
stood the Japanese government, which was directly responsible
for a substantial portion of the financing of the silk trade. 46
CONCLUSION

Why the Japanese government promoted the development of
banking far earlier than the Chinese; why Japanese companies
took direct control of exporting, while Chinese companies left
the exporting side to foreign firms; and why Japanese firms directly controlled shipping, while Chinese companies permitted
foreign firms to dominate shipping along the China coast, are all
basic questions that must be addressed in the larger context of
Chinese and Japanese economic history, but that lie beyond the
scope of this inquiry. The experience of the silk industry, however, highlights certain aspects of economic development that
have received relatively little attention. The growth of the Japanese silk industry, and its pre-eminence in the international
market by the early twentieth century, while dramatic in appearance, was also based on factors that are less than dramatic.
It was not merely a story of strong government, big business, and
the direct export movement after serving in France as diplomats. Hoshino ChOtaI'O ofGumma and Hasegawa
Hanshichi were important rural leaders. On exports, see, Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyOshi bumeki, 64; Yagi
Haruo, Nihon keizaishi galsetsu, 282-283; Yamaguchi Kazuo, Nihon sangyo, 10-11; Nakamura Masanori,
"Seishigyo no tenkai," 56; Ishii Kanji Nihon sanshigyoshl, 424-425. On Katakura, see Allen and Donmthorne, Western Enterprise, 227.
46 Ohara Keishi,Japanese Trade and Industry, 262-6.'.l; Kenzo Hemmi, "Primary Product Exports," 316;
and Yamaguchi Kazuo, Nihon sangyo, 514-623 passim. Ishii Kanji, Nihon sanshigyoshi, 413. Yagi Haruo,
Nihon keizaishi gaisetsu, 260; Kenzo Hemmi, "Primary Product Exports," 316. Hugh T. Patrick, "Japan,
1868-1914," in Rondo E. Cameron, ed., Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization (New York, 1967),
279. Hemmi, "Primary Product Exports," 316, estimates on the basis ofYamaguchi's data, that bank loans
amounted to 25--30,000,000 yen in 1907, a year when sericultural production amounted to 192,000,000 yen.
Patrick, "Japan," 249, feels that government leadership in developing the banking system has been exaggerated. He prefers to stress the importance of private initiative.
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rapid technological change, but also a story of significant early
modern momentum, steady incremental growth on a small scale,
and the continued strength of the rural sector and its integration
with the industrialized sector. From an historian's point of view,
the degree to which fundamental changes in technology and
economic organization had already been set into motion in Japan
before the opening of the treaty ports, and the degree to which
"modernization" rested on traditional forces and institutions, are
most impressive.
Although this essay has focused on the more successful performance of the Japanese silk industry in the world market, and
in so doing has emphasized the differences between Chinese
and Japanese economic performances, it must be said that the
Chinese industry did not perform poorly. It was not unresponsive
to market opportunities. The industry did expand and change.
It is simply that the extent of the change was not sufficient to
have a structural impact. From a longer historical perspective,
however, as the nineteenth century recedes further into the past,
the similarities between Chinese and Japanese institutions and
practices will indeed appear more striking than their differences,
and their common strengths more important than their weaknesses. Shorter-term historical and economic factors will play a
larger role in explaining short-term phenomena. It is only when
we view the Chinese experience in juxtaposition with the Japanese, and in the context of the international market during this
relatively limited period of time, that the Chinese industry seems
backward or unsuccessful.
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